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Both the United States and Australia are constitutional democracies with 
a common law heritage. Both value free speech, but they have different 
means of implementing that value. Until recently, that difference was 
between a common law principle and a judicially protected constitutional 
freedom. Australian courtsused freedom of speech as a tool of statutory 
construction.1 The Australian Constitution has no free speech clause, and 
for many years it was assumed that the power of Parliament was not 
limited by any constitutionally protected freedom. 2 This assumption 
proved wrong when the High Court, in Australian Capital Television Pty 
Limited v The Commonwealth,3 held that freedom of political discussion is 
implicit in the Constitution because it is a necessary element of repre-
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1 Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514,523, per Brennan J; Potter v Minahan (1908) 
7 CLR 277, 304, per O'Connor J. 
2 
'A court will interpret laws of the Parliament in light of a presumption that the Parlia-
ment does not intend to abrogate human rights and fundamental freedoms, but the court 
cannot deny the validity of an exercise of a legislative power expressly granted merely 
on the ground that the law abrogates human rights and fundamental freedoms or trenches 
upon political rights which, in the court's opinion, should be preserved': Nationwide 
News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 43, per Brennan J. 
3 (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News Ply Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Theophanous v 
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd 
(1994) 124 ALR 80; and Cunliffe v Commonwealtl! (1994) 124 ALR 120. 
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sentative democracy, a basic principle inferred from the structure and 
express provisions of the Australian Constitution. This 1992 decision adds 
a new dimension to the debate on whether to adopt a constitutional pro-
vision on free speech in Australia.4 The question is no longer only whether 
freedom of speech should be constitutionally protected, but also whether 
such protection should be based on a new express clause or continue to 
be implied from existing provisions. 
Interpretation is necessary to apply a Constitution to a specific situa-
tion. The process ranges from declaring the plain meaning of text to cre-
ating principles with no specific textual roots. Along this spectrum, the 
interpretation of express language is not always clearly distinguishable 
from implying a principle from the document's language or structure. 
Some may even argue that these are false categories. The categories are 
recognised in practice, and for the purpose of addressing whether to sup-
port an express constitutional provision on freedom of political discus-
sion in Australia, it is argued that the distinction makes a difference. 
This note addresses the differences between express and implied con-
stitutional freedoms, but it does not attempt to directly compare Aus-
tralia with the United States. Three years is too short a period to discern 
with any confidence the ultimate scope of the implied freedom of politi-
cal discussion in Australia or the standards that will be applied. Further, 
the historical development of the principle in the society, the traditions of 
the judiciary, and the personality and background of the specific judges 
are more important influences on the ultimate contours of a judicially 
protected freedom than whether it is expressly secured in the Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, the American experience is relevant to evaluating the 
contrast between an express and an implied clause. 
THE ENTRENCHMENT OF AN EXPRESS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
An express freedom is more entrenched than if it were only implied. There 
is objective evidence of public support for it, it is more likely to become a 
part of the core educational process for citizens, the judicial role in inter-
pretation is less open to criticism, and there are fewer ways to terminate 
it. It does not mean the implied principle is likely to be repudiated, but 
courts may give greater deference to government than if the implication 
were made explicit. Whether that is an advantage depends on the degree 
to which such deference is considered desirable. 
4 Philip Alston (ed.), Towards an Australian Bill of Rights (Canberra: Centre for Interna-
tional and Public Law, Australian National University, Human Rights and Equal Oppor-
tunity Commission, 1994). 
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Evidence of Political Support 
The express provision provides direct evidence that a supermajority5 at 
one time coalesced on the importance of the stated principle. By placing 
it in the Constitution, Parliament showed agreement not only upon its 
verbal formulation, but upon its nature as fundamental. It is a result of a 
process spelled out in the foundational document. An implied freedom 
lacks a similar imprimatur. 
The Constitution prescribes processes for establishing a principle to 
limit the power of the government. Following those processes to obtain 
an express provision in the Constitution is difficult and requires wide-
spread popular support. Its adoption does not show that supporters un-
derstood or agreed upon its meaning, but it does demonstrate agreement 
on the need to make specific language part of the Constitution. 
A judicially implied limit on government power may have just as much 
popular support as an explicit one, but there is no conventional mecha-
nism to express that support. An implication suggests that express con-
stitutional provisions included acceptance of the implied principle, but 
an inference is not as conclusive as adoption of the express language. 
Public opinion polls, political demonstrations, and the behaviour of indi-
viduals and organisations may indicate that an implied principle is em-
bedded in the society. A principle may be deeply embedded, as freedom 
of speech is in England, without being appropriate for use by the judici-
ary to override legislation. Failure to amend the Constitution to reverse 
the judicial implication of a constitutional limit is similarly inconclusive 
as an indicator of popular support for judicial protection of the principle. 
Amendment requires a supermajority, agreement on specific language, 
and overcoming indifference and inertia as well as active opposition. The 
difficulty of amendment is one illustration that an express constitutional 
provision satisfies the conventions for creating fundamental principles 
in a way that no evidence of support for an implied principle can match. 
Educational Effect 
Express protection of a constitutional freedom has the didactic advan-
tage of putting the societal expression of basic principle in concrete form. 
The First Amendment to the United States' Constitution provides: 'Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.'6 An implied freedom does not have a similar fixed form. Mason 
5 A supermajority requirement goes beyond a simple majority: see, for example, s. 128 of 
the Commonwealth Constitution. Section 128 allows for alterations of the Constitution 
so long as there is a majority of the electorate as well as a majority of the States. 
' Constitution of the United States, Amendment I. 
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CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ described the comparable constitutional free-
dom in Australia as: 
... 'freedom of communication, at least in relation to public affairs and politi-
cal discussion', 'freedom ... to discuss governments and political matters', 
'freedom of communication about the government of the Commonwealth' 
which 'extends to all political matters', including 'matters relating to other 
levels of government', 'freedom of political discourse' and 'freedom of par-
ticipation, association and communication in relation to federal elections'.' 
Although there is acknowledgment that the last formulation differed 
substantially from the others, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ suggested 
the other phrases would serve as expressions of the constitutional princi-
ple. Precedent and convention may ultimately produce a single accepted 
verbal formula, but any court would be free to restate the principle in 
different words. It is the implication of the principle and not its specific 
wording that the courts claim is constitutionally binding. 
Teachers can point to the First Amendment more easily than explain-
ing Australian Capital Television Pty Limited v The Commonwealth' to their 
students. Students can readily memorise the Amendment's text and grasp 
the idea that constitutional text is fundamental. Teachers are therefore 
likely to discuss the express guarantee at an earlier point than the more 
complex phenomenon of an implied freedom. Any society, whether its 
constitutional guarantee is express, implied or nonexistent, can inculcate 
an understanding of the principles of freedom of speech, but it is easier to 
persuade children that the freedom is fundamental when it is stated ex-
pressly. English school children may be exposed to Milton9 and MilP0 and 
to the importance of free speech as declaimed in Hyde Park, and some 
Americans remain blissfully unaware of their constitutional rights 
(except a:? distorted on television). English Jchool children learn that free-
dom of speech does not limit parliamentary power in their system of gov-
ernment. Where the principle of freedom of speech limits the legislature, 
students will be taught the reasons for the limitation, but disagreement 
with those reasons has different consequences when the principle is im-
plied rather than express. If a student thinks the reasons for implying a 
freedom are weak, he or she is challenging whether the principle is fun-
damental. Disagreement with the rationale for an express freedom, how-
ever, does not threaten the perception that the principle is fundamental 
in this society. The embodiment of a principle in an -express provision 
7 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1, 11 (footnote citations omit-
ted). 
R (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
9 John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the Parliament 
of England 1644 (London: N. Douglas, 1927). . 
10 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: 1859; reprinted Harmondsworth, Baltimore: Pen-
guin, 1974). 
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therefore gives it a momentum for acceptance by citizens that the judicial 
pronouncement of an implied freedom lacks. 
Support for the Judicial Role 
Disagreement with judicial interpretation of an express provision is not a 
challenge to the existence of the provision, and it rarely attacks the role of 
the court as interpreter. The principle was adopted by the people, and the 
issue is whether the court's particular application is correct. The court 
may be wrong, but it is the appropriate body to interpret express lan-
guage in the Constitution. 
The authority of the judiciary to imply a constitutional limit is itself 
implied from the Constitution. Where an implied freedom is in question, 
the challenge to the implication is closer to a crihcism of the court's role 
- namely, the court is wrong because its appropriate role is limited to 
the interpretation of express language. The principle appears to have been 
judicially created, and the challenge is to its very existence. 
It is easy to exaggerate the difference. Even judges who disagree with 
the implied right of political discussion agree that the Constitution gives 
rise to implications that limit government power.U The argument that it 
is improper for a judg~ to imply rights is a weak one. The stronger argu-
ment is that the particuiar right is not properly implied rather than a chal-
lenge to the court's role. Nevertheless, the implication of a constitutional 
freedom highlights the creative function of the court. 
Difficulty of Termination 
Only a constitutional amendment can abolish the First Amendment. Al-
though there have been proposals to change the Constitution to overturn 
Supreme Court free speech decisions, most recently in response to the 
invalidation of a federal law against burning the flag, 12 none have yet 
passed the first step of securing Congressional approval. 
The Australian High Court can overturn its decisions on freedom of 
political discussion. The court has changed its view on constitutional 
implications in. the past. In the Engineers case,13 for example, the High Court 
of Australia reconsidered whether the existence of State powers gave rise 
to an implied limit on national powers. The power to terminate an im-
11 For example, 'an election in which the electors are denied access 'o the information nec-
essary for the exercise of a true choice is not the kind of election envisaged by the Consti-
tution': Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106,187, per 
DaM;onJ. 
12 Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
13 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
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plied freedom by interpretation distinguishes it from the express clause 
at the level of the formal existence of a constitutional principle. 
Whether an implied freedom is less protective than an express one 
depends primarily on factors external to the distinction between implied 
and express. During its first 130 years, the First Amendment to the United 
States' Constitution had no bite. At first, the Supreme Court interpreted 
freedom of speech to proscribe previous restraints on speech but not to 
prevent subsequent punishment 'of such as may be deemed contrary to 
the public welfare'. 14 Later it said the Amendment permits punishment 
of those who abuse freedom by utterances 'inimical to the public welfare, 
tending to corrupt morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace'. 15 
Coupled with a deferential presumption in favour of the validity of legis-
lation, this 'bad tendency' test invalidated no laws. After all, unless the 
government perceives a danger from speech, it has no reason to act. 
Holmes J changed his views on the First Amendment and began writing 
dissents in 1919 that urged more protection for speech. 16 Holmes and 
Brandeis JJ dissented in free_ speech cases for more than a decade before 
their views gained majority support. 17 The United States' Supreme Court, 
in 1954, upheld the imprisonment of a number of leading American com-
munists despite free speech arguments. 18 In contrast, the Australian High 
Court was able to protect the existence of the Communist Party with no 
reference to any constitutional guarantee of free speech. 19 
Since judicial interpretation can render both express and implied 
freedoms ineffective, the insulation of an express provision from a formal 
repeal by the court is significant only to the extent that its formal exist-
ence is significant. 
It is as unlikely that the High Court of Australia will reverse its deci-
sion on the implied freedom of political discussion as it is that the Su-
preme Court will revert to the hollow reading of the First Amendment. 
Precedent and the current domestic and international context of concern 
for human rights support a meaningful restriction on government power 
to interfere with political discussion. Nevertheless, the express provision 
supports judicial confidence in the appropriateness of the court's role to 
enforce the principle against other institutions of government. The lack 
of such demonstrated support may make courts more cautious in limit-
ing government. Thus they may imply a freedom within a more limited 
14 Patterson v Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
15 Gitlow v New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (emphasis supplied). 
16 See Abrams v United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
17 Git/ow v People of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes and Brandeis JJ dissenting); 
Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes JJ concurring).' Although 
no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions 
in those cases, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the 
Holmes-Brandeis rationale': United States v Dennis, 341 US. 494 (1954). 
1
' US v Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1954). 
19 The Amalgamated Engineering Union Australia Section and Rowe v The Commonwealth (Com-
munist Party Dissolution case) (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
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range than would be found for a provision that expressly articulated 
the principle. 
The Consequences of Entrenchment 
The vulnerability of an implied freedom to reversal or at least restricted 
application is arguably an advantage. Any constitutional provision may 
be unwise, because it enables the judiciary to overturn laws that the ma-
jority of the nation believE's to be both desirable and consistent with free-
dom of speech. Defamn.tion,20 campaign spending reform/1 and hate 
speech laws22 are all exr.mples of legislation that a majority may find ap-
propriate, although a court may impose sharp limits on them. Although 
processes of government preclude any easy identification of Parliament 
with the will of the majority, the legislature is still a better reflection of 
popular will than the court.23 Thus the more limited the judicial protec-
tion of a constitutional right, the more responsive the principle will be to 
the people. 
A further 1rgument against constitutionalising rights is that it may 
encourage p'.c!ople to rely on the court at the expense of the political proc-
ess. This can lead to the loss of the principle's vitality in society as a whole 
because i1: is not debated in the political forum. 24 Even advocates of judi-
cial activism in the United States are now urging greater focus on the 
political process.25 This argument is very contextual, for there may be no 
discu :>sion and no protection of any sort in the absence of an express pro-
visirJn. In a modified form, however, it has been a popular argument in 
Australia. Where there is a tradition of freedom of speech, the people 
may be trusted to care for it.26 
The United States has been less trusting of the people. The purpose of 
an individual rights guarantee, such as freedom of speech, is to limit the 
power of government over the individual. Proponents of such guaran-
20 See New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [U.S.]; Theopl~anous v Herald & Weekly 
Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1 [Australia]. 
21 See Buckley v Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) [U.S.]; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Com-
monwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 [Australia]. 
22 R.A. V. v City of St. Paul112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); see David Bogen, 'A United States Perspec-
tive on the Racial Hatred Bill1994' [unpublished manuscript on file with the Review]. 
23 See Gabriel A. Moens, 'The Wrongs of a Constitutionally Entrenched Bill of Rights', in 
M.A. Stephenson and Clive Turner (eds), Australia: Republic or Monarchy (Brisbane: Uni-
versity of Queensland Press, 1994); Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-
91 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
24 See Paul Brest, 'Constitutional Citizenship' (1986) 34 Cleveland Stale Law Review 1. 
25 Robin West, 'Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism' (1990) 88 Michigan Law 
Review 641. 
26 See R.C.L. Moffatt, 'Philosophical Foundations of the Australian Constitutional Tradi-
tion' (1965) 5 Sydney Law Review 85, 86; Owen Dixon, 'Two Constitutions Compared', in 
Hon. J. Woinarski (ed.), Jesting Pilate and other Papers and Addresses (Sydney: Law Book 
Co., 1965), 100; Robert Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth (London: 
Cassell, 1967), 54. 
2JCULR Comparing Implied and Express Constitutional Freedoms 197 
tees are not dismayed by popular disagreement with particular decisions 
that restrict government. Conflict over the application of principles is in-
evitable, and a check outside the legislature helps to assure that the reso-
lution does not always favour government. 
THE DERIVATION OF AN IMPLIED FREEDOM 
An implication is a product of a chain of reasoning and the court is likely 
to articulate its basis. The Australian guarantee of freedom of political 
discussion is inferred from the principle of representative democracy.27 
The rationale for an express freedom may be less clear. The First Amend-
ment does not state its rationale, and multiple justifications have been 
urged, with sometimes inconsistent effects on the scope of the provision 
and the standards under it. Changing an implied freedom into an 
express one may increase judicial discretion by expanding the possible 
supporting rationales and encouraging courts to be less deferential to 
govemrnent. 
The Articulation of Rationale 
A court construing an express provision can discuss and explore thor-
oughly its rationale, while one that has an implied freedom may rely on 
precedent rather than discussion in future decisions. The tendency, how-
ever, is likely to be to the contrary. Where a principle is expressly stated in 
the Constitution, the particular rationale may not be critical to its appli-
cation and a court need not be concerned with persuading the public that 
it is ,acting appropriately in enforcing the principle. On the other hand, 
the legitimacy of the court's action in applying an implied principle de-
pends upon the rationale, so the court is more likely to refer to it. The 
need to recur to the rationale for the implied freedom keeps the rationale 
vital in a way related to the vitality produced by forcing the principle to 
be the subject of political debate. The principle may be better understood 
because it is not just the principle, but its rationale as well that must be 
discussed. 
This does not mean there is only one possible rationale for implying a 
freedom. The opinions found in recent decisions of· the High Court of 
Australia vary. McHugh f 8 implied from the express provisions on elec-
tion that candidates must be able to present their views to the electorate 
27 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1, 11. 
2
' Id. 71-77, per McHugh J dissenting. 
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after the election is called. Mason CJ/9 Gaudron30 and Brennan JV' inter 
alia,32 found in provisions on constitutional amendment as well as those 
on elections an implication of representative democracy that extends to 
discussion among individuals of any political issue. Toohey and Deane 
JP3 have even suggested there are fundamental rights implied in the very 
formation of the Constitution.34 The point is not that there can be only 
one basis to imply freedom of speech, but that the absence of an express 
provision requires the court to articulate the basis for its decision in terms 
of an underlying rationale. 
The Possibility of Multiple Rationales 
The First Amendment lacks the single coherent rationale. It reflected wide-
spread fear that the national government would seize power and engage 
in legislation restricting speech - if restrictions were warranted, it was 
thought to be a matter for state law. At this general level, few people had 
and few needed any specific definition for the concept.35 Most of the philo-
sophical justifications for the provision have been articulated after the 
clause itself was adopted. 
In the 19th century, Mill36 argued for freedom of speech as the best 
mechanism for attaining truth. This theory was seized upon by Holmes J 
in Abrams v U.S. 37 when he diss~nted, stating, 'The best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market.' 
In the 20th century, Alexander Meiklejohn contended that freedom of 
speech was a necessary precondition for self-govemment.38 His views on 
the scope of protection broadened dramatically in response to Professor 
Zechariah Chafee's critique.39 The theory of democratic self-government 
underlies the Australian High Court's decisions, and it is evident in nu-
merous American cases including New York Times v Sullivan. 40 
29 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Tire Cornmonwealtlr (1992) 177 CLR 106, 139. 
30 ld. 221. 
31 Nationwide News Pty Limited v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 48. 
32 Id. 72-75, per Deane and Toohey JJ; Leighton McDonald, 'The Denizens of Democracy: 
The High Court and the "Free Speech" Cases' (1994) 5 Public Law Review 160. 
33 Leeth v The Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 445, 485-7; L. Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill 
of Rights' (1994} 16 Sydney Law Review 166, 180-4. 
"' See Leeth v The Commonwealth (1992} 174 CLR 455, 485-7, per Deane and Toohey JJ dis-
senting. 
35 See David Bogen, Bulwark of Liberty (New York: Associated Faculties Press, 1984). 
,. Mill, supra n. 10. 
37 250 u.s. 616 (1919). 
30 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speeclr and its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper, 
1948}. 
39 Rodney Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society (New York: Knopf, 1992), 15-16 . 
.. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
~ 
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Self-government and the search for truth are instrumental justifica-
tions for freedom of speech- that is, the court protects free speech in 
order to attain a higher end. There are a number of other justifications of 
this nature that receive less attention in the literature. Brandeis J once 
wrote, 'Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant.'41 It is better to permit 
people with despicable views to air them than to forbid their utterance 
because (1) it gives them a release, like the steam valve, to prevent their 
grievance from festering and forcing them to violent reaction; (2) it opens 
their views to rebuttal that may change their opinions; and (3) it enables 
society to know where the dangers may come from. Another argument 
for freedom of speech put forward by Lee Bollinger is that 1t benefits the 
character of society to be tolerantY 
A very different philosophical base for freedom of speech focuses on 
the speaker rather than the society's interest in allowing speech. Brandeis 
J argued that 'free speech is valuable both as an end and as a means'. 
Concurring in Whitney v California,43 he said, '[T]hose who won our inde-
pendence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to 
develop their faculties.' 
The various strands of justification often unite when the court dis-
cusses the principle of free speech. Kennedy J stated, 'At the heart of 
the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide 
for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consid-
eration and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon 
this ideal. ' 44 -
The multiplicity of rationales means the principle may extend farther 
than any single rationale would justify. The search for truth or concerns 
for self-government may underlie the protection of the distribution of 
mechanically reproduced speech while concern for self-realisation sup-
ports the Amendment's application to nude dancing. 
The multiple rationales may also complicate the standards used and 
add to the uncertainty of results reached. Where multiple rationales are 
available, emphasis on one rationale over another can be used to contract 
the scope of the guarantee or to weaken the standard used to judge con-
stitutionality. Commercial speech45 and appeals to sexuality,46 for exam-
ple, are sometimes discussed as lesser forms of protected speech which 
receive a lower standard of protection. 
" Louis D. Brandeis, Ot/1er People's Money and How tl1e Bankers Use It (New York: Stokes, 
1914). 
42 Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
43 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
44 Thrner Broadcasting System v Federal Communications Commission 114S. Ct. 2445,2458 (1994). 
45 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
4
• 'Society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser. 
magnitude than the interest in untrammelled political debate': Young v Amencan M1m 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens J). 
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Insistence on a single rationale for the protection of freedom of speech 
has the weakness that repudiation of that rationale eliminates the princi-
ple. Where multiple rationales support a principle, the elimination of 
one may not prove fatal. In core areas, the principle is supported by all 
its rationales. 
CONSTRAINING THE EXPRESS PROVISION 
The express provision for freedom of speech in the United States offers 
great discretion to the courts because choice can be made from a variety 
of rationales. It is not unreasonable for a society to believe that some of 
these rationales do not justify invalidating laws made by majoritarian 
institutions while others do, and to consider appropriate methods of lim-
iting the scope of the provision. A common form in some of the original 
declarations of rights in the states was to include a preamble that 
discussed reasons for the commands that followed. A statement of 
the principle in terms of its rationale or with a preamble that pointed 
to the rationale could serve equally well to confine the principle to the 
specific rationale.47 
Opponents of the implication of rights might be tempted to support 
an express guarantee as a means of restraining the court on the theory 
that it would not go beyond the limits justified by the language of the 
express guarantee. The express nature of the provision has not been a 
significant limitation on the court's interpretive discretion in the United 
States. The words 'freedom of speech and of the press' are capable of 
application to all forms of speech and publication whether public or pri-
vate, commercial or altruistic, gossip or philosophy, sex or science. The 
words do not preclude the court from extending their express scope by 
implication. The Supreme Court has reasoned that freedom of speech 
implies freedom of association. The communication of ideas requires 
an audience.48 Speech, in the sense of language, is only one medium for 
communicating ideas. Recognising that sign language is a form of speech 
is only a small step from finding that any means of communicating ideas 
is within the scope of freedom of speech and press. Scalia J, of the 
Supreme Court, has insisted that conduct is not protected by the First 
Amendment unless the rationale for its regulation is the suppression of 
its communicative aspects.49 The remaining members of the court, how-
ever, have swept nude dancing and flag burning into the protected area 
of the First Amendment. 
" Such a constraint is only relative. The words themselves would not be determinative. 
See Anthony D'Amato, 'Can Legislatures Restrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?' 
(1989} 75 Virginia Law Review 561. 
'" NAACP v Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
•• Barnes v Glen Tlreater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
If the Australian people decide to adopt an express guarantee of freedom 
of speech by amendment to their constitution, it is likely to encourage the 
High Court to take an expansive view of that protection. The scope of the 
freedom may be described with greater precision and the rationale made 
express as ways to confine the court to the policy of protecting self-gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, the announcement of that principle by express 
constitutional proclamation would reaffirm the correctness of the court's 
perception that it is a basic principle of Australian society and would be 
likely to encourage the justices to act more boldly in giving it content. 
